from The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God, translated by David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992), 51-57.
As for His saying Allah, it is a name for the true existent, the one who unites
the attributes of divinity, is subject of the attributes of lordship, and unique in true existence. . . .
A lesson. You should know that this name is the greatest of the ninety-nine names of God—great and glorious—because it refers to the essence which unites all the attributes of divinity, so that none of them is left out, whereas each of the remaining names only refers to a single attribute: knowledge, power, agency, and the rest. . . .
Counsel. Man's share in this name should be for him to become godlike, by which I mean that his heart and his aspiration be taken up with God—great and glorious, that he does not look towards anything other than Him nor pay attention to what is not He, that he neither implore nor fear anyone but Him. How could it be otherwise? For it had already been understood from his name that He is the truly actual Existent, and that everything other than He is ephemeral, perishing and worthless except in relation to Him. [The Servant] sees himself first of all as the first of the perishing and worthless, as did the messenger of God—may God's grace and peace be upon him—when he said: "the truest verse uttered by the Arabs was Labid's saying:
Surely everything except God is vain,
And every happiness is doubtless ephemeral."
2, 3. Al-Rahman, Al-Rahim—The Infinitely Good, the Merciful—are two names derived from "mercy." Mercy requires an object of mercy, and no one is an object of mercy unless he be in need. Yet the one by whom the needs of the needy are fulfilled will not be called merciful if that is accomplished without intention, volition, or concern for the one in need. Nor is one called merciful who wants to fulfill their needs yet does not meet them even though he be able to fulfill them, because if the will were there he would have carried it out. But if he be unable to fulfill them, he is still called merciful—though in a deficient sense—in view of the empathy which affected him. Perfect mercy is pouring out benefaction to those in need, and directing it to them, for their care; and inclusive mercy is when it embraces deserving and undeserving alike. The mercy of God—great and glorious—is both perfect and inclusive: perfect inasmuch as it wants to fulfill the needs of those in need and does meet them; and inclusive inasmuch as it embraces both deserving and undeserving, encompassing this world and the next, and includes bare necessities and needs, and special gifts over and above them. So He is utterly and truly merciful.
Implications. Mercy is not without a painful empathy which affects the merciful, and moves him to satisfy the needs of the one receiving mercy. Yet the Lord—praise be to Him most high—transcends that, so you may think that this diminishes the meaning of mercy. But you should know that this is a perfection and does not diminish the meaning of mercy. It is not diminished inasmuch as the perfection of mercy depends on the perfection of its fruits. So long as the needs of those in need are perfectly fulfilled, the one who receives mercy has no need of suffering or distress in the merciful one; rather the suffering of the merciful only stems from a weakness and defect in himself. Moreover, this weakness adds nothing to the goal of those in need once their needs have been perfectly fulfilled. So far as God's mercy perfectly fulfilling the meaning of mercy is concerned, we should recall that one who is merciful out of empathy and suffering comes close to intending to alleviate his own suffering and sensitivity by his actions, thereby looking after himself and seeking his own goals, and that would take away from the perfection of the meaning of mercy. Rather, the perfection of mercy consists in looking after the one receiving mercy for the sake of the one receiving mercy, and not for the sake of being relieved from one's own suffering and sensitivity.
Lesson. Al-Rahman is more specific than Al-Rahim, in that no one except God—great and glorious—is named by it whereas Al-Rahim may be used for others. . . . The Infinitely Good is He who loves men, first by creating them; second, by guiding them to faith and to the means of salvation; third, by making them happy in the next world; and fourth, by granting them the contemplation of His noble face. . . .
A question and its answer. You might say: what does it mean for Him, the most high, to be merciful and to be the most merciful of those who are merciful? For one who is merciful does not see people afflicted or injured, tormented or sick, without hastening to remove that condition when he can do so. But the Lord—praise to Him most high—has the power to meet every affliction, to stave off every need and distress, to eliminate every sickness, and to remove every harm, even though He leaves His servants to be tried by disasters and hardships while the world is overflowing with disease, calamities, and tribulations, yet He is able to remove them all. The merciful one certainly wants good for the one who receives mercy. Yet there is no evil in existence which does not contain some good within it, and were that evil to be eliminated, the good within it would be nullified, and the final result would be an evil worse than the evil containing the good. The certain amputation of a hand is an evident evil, yet within it lies an ample good: the health of the body. If one were to forego the amputation of the hand, the body would perish as a result—a worse evil still. So amputating a hand for the health of the body is an evil which contains good within it. But the primary intention which comes first in the consideration of one amputating is health—an unadulterated good. Yet since amputating the hand is the way to achieve it, amputation is intended for the sake of that good; so health was sought for itself first, and amputation second for the sake of the other and not for itself. They both enter into the intention, but one of them is intended for itself and the other for the sake of the first, and what is intended for its own sake takes precedence over that which is intended for the sake of the other; here the saying of God—great and glorious—is a propos: "My mercy precedes My anger." His anger is His intending evil, so evil is by His intention, while His mercy is His intending good, [so good is by His intention]. But if He intended good for the good itself, yet intended evil not for itself but because there is some good within it; then good is accomplished essentially but evil is accomplished accidentally, and each according to divine decree. So nothing here goes against mercy at all.
The answer to your [problem] is that a small child's mother may be tender towards him and so keep him from undergoing cupping2, while the wise father makes him do it by force. An ignorant person thinks that the compassionate one is the mother rather than the father, while the intelligent understand that the father's hurting him by cupping reflects the perfection of his mercy and love as well as the completeness of his compassion; whereas the mother was his enemy in the guise of a friend, since a little suffering, when it is a cause of great joy, is not evil but good.
Now, if a particular evil occurs to you without your seeing any particular good beneath it, or should you think it possible that a particular good be achieved without its being contained in evil, you should query whether your reasoning might not be deficient in each of these two trains of thought. As for saying that this evil has no good beneath it, minds simply are not up to knowing that. In this regard you are perhaps like a boy who saw cupping as nothing but an evil, or like the ignorant person who sees punishment by death as an unmitigated evil, because he is considering the particular qualities of the individual executed, for whom it is indeed a sheer evil, while overlooking the common good gained for the entire population. So he does not see that a particular evil leading to a public good is an unadulterated good: something which a good man ought not to overlook.
Or you should question your reasoning concerning the second train of thought, when you said that it was possible that this good be attained without being contained in that evil. Here too there is something obscure and subtle: the possibility or impossibility of everything possible or impossible cannot be perceived spontaneously nor by a simple survey, but may perhaps be known by an obscure, subtle discernment which the majority fails to reach.
So accuse your reasoning in both these ways, and never doubt that He is the most merciful of the merciful, or that "His mercy takes precedence over His anger," and never doubt that the one who intends evil for the sake of evil and not for the sake of good is undeserving of the name of mercy. Beneath all this lies a secret whose divulgence the revelation prohibits, so be content with prayer and do not expect that it be divulged. You have been instructed by signs and given directions; so, if you are worthy of them, then ponder them!
You would have been heard
Were you calling a living person
But there is no life
In the one you call.
This is the condition of the majority—but I do not think that you, my brother, for whom this explanation is intended, lack the capacity to ponder the secrets of God—great and glorious—in the divine decree, so all these hints and notices are unnecessary for you.
2. Cupping is a procedure using a heated receptacle to draw blood from punctured veins by creating a partial vacuum.
Al-Ghazali Commentary
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