The Melian Dialogue

THUCYDIDES

Introduction to Great Books

SAMPLE UNIT
About the Great Books Foundation

What is the Great Books Foundation?

The Great Books Foundation is an independent, nonprofit educational organization whose mission is to help people learn how to think and share ideas. Toward this end, the Foundation offers workshops in the Shared Inquiry™ method of learning and publishes collections of classic and modern texts for both children and adults.

The Great Books Foundation was established in 1947 to promote liberal education for the general public. In 1962, the Foundation extended its mission to children with the introduction of Junior Great Books. Since its inception, the Foundation has helped thousands of people throughout the United States and in other countries begin their own discussion groups in schools, libraries, and community centers. Today, Foundation instructors conduct hundreds of workshops each year, in which educators and volunteers learn to lead Shared Inquiry discussion.

What Resources Are Available to Support My Participation in Shared Inquiry?

The Great Books Foundation offers workshops in Shared Inquiry to help people get the most from discussion. Participants learn how to read actively, pose fruitful questions, and listen and respond to others effectively in discussion. All participants also practice leading a discussion and have an opportunity to reflect on the process with others. For more information about Great Books materials or workshops, call the Great Books Foundation at 800-222-5870 or visit our web site at www.greatbooks.org.

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Introduction to Great Books

A Program of Interpretive Reading, Writing, and Discussion

In Introduction to Great Books, students have many opportunities to interact with thought-provoking literature as they develop their reading, writing, oral communication, and critical-thinking skills. Because of the Great Books emphasis on discussion and focus on interpretation, all students—regardless of their experience in reading challenging literature—will be able to contribute, and will grow in their ability to do so.

Introduction to Great Books develops students’ reading comprehension in the context of thinking about genuine problems of meaning raised by a selection. The program’s interpretive activities are designed to help students become more aware of their reactions as they read, develop a sensitivity to language, and value their own curiosity about a text. Writing—from note taking to the composition of elaborated essays—is stressed throughout Introduction to Great Books as an integral part of students’ ongoing, personal engagement with the text.

The Shared Inquiry™ method of reading and discussion developed by the Great Books Foundation enables instructors to create a thoughtful learning environment in the classroom. Through their own curiosity and attentive questioning, instructors serve as partners in inquiry with their students, helping them work together to discover meaning in a selection and build interpretations. The Foundation provides training for instructors in the Shared Inquiry method and offers a variety of support materials.

Following is a description of the Introduction to Great Books interpretive activities and their objectives, illustrated by the unit for “The Melian Dialogue” by Thucydides. Instructors can cover a unit in two to five class periods per week; the program’s Leader’s Guide suggests ways to adapt this flexible schedule.
The Introduction to Great Books Reading, Writing, and Discussion Sequence

- Answering a prereading question
- Reading twice and taking notes
- Sharing students’ notes and questions
- Shared Inquiry discussion
- Textual analysis
- Postdiscussion writing

For each Introduction to Great Books selection, the Leader’s Guides offer:

**Prereading questions** that give students an intellectual context for the selection and encourage a positive and sympathetic response. Answering a prereading question briefly in writing allows students to bring forward their own thoughts, experiences, and attitudes regarding the subjects they will encounter in the selection. Students can share their answers, add new thoughts after the first reading, or return to these questions as a post-discussion writing assignment.

**Interpretive note sources** that direct students’ reading and note taking by providing a specific issue on which they can focus. Students use their responses as a basis for further interpretive thinking. Sharing their notes increases students’ awareness of a selection’s interpretive range and improves their ability to call up and use supporting evidence for their opinions.

**Interpretive questions for Shared Inquiry discussion** that give students an opportunity to express their own ideas, listen to their classmates’ perspectives, and synthesize different viewpoints to reach a deeper, more informed understanding of the text. Shared Inquiry discussion focuses on significant problems of meaning in a text, to which the instructor has no set answer. Instructors can use the questions in the Leader’s Guide to stimulate thought-
provoking discussions, or they can write their own interpretive questions.

**Passages for textual analysis** that reward close examination. The instructor may conduct textual analysis of especially rich or challenging passages during Shared Inquiry discussion. Or, small groups of students can work together, raising and considering their own questions as a means of furthering their understanding of the passage.

**Postdiscussion writing questions** that give students an opportunity to extend their thinking, as they assimilate new ideas and measure them against their personal experience and opinions. Writing after discussion brings to completion the students’ experience of a selection.

### How to Use This Sample Unit

Following are the specific activities developed to help students read and discuss “The Melian Dialogue,” a selection from Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*. “The Melian Dialogue” touches on such issues as the use and abuse of power, the value and meaning of life, the difference between courage and foolhardiness, and what it means to live honorably. The instructor can use the questions and activities in the Leader’s Guide to help students make a connection between the selection and their own experience—a crucial step if students are to stay with a challenging text and get something out of it.

Before reading the selection, we encourage you to consider your own ideas regarding one of the prereading questions. We also suggest that you pause after your first reading to jot down any questions you have about what the characters did or what the author meant. Then try using the interpretive note source during a second reading to see how it keeps you involved and thinking during the reading process. Finally, share your thoughts about
the selection with a colleague to see how this stimulates your own thinking and leads you to see more in the text than you would have on your own.

Activities and Questions from the Leader’s Guide

The Melian Dialogue

*Thucydides*

**Prereading Questions**

1. Which is more important—freedom or survival?
2. How can hope sometimes give you strength, and sometimes mislead you?
3. Is it honorable or stupid to carry on a fight against overwhelming odds? Is honor more important than life itself?
4. Can a slave live a dignified and honorable life?
5. Why is it sometimes hard to remain neutral in an argument or fight? Do you respect people who try not to take sides in a dispute?

**Interpretive Note Source**

Mark places where you think the Athenians give a good reason for the Melians to surrender. Mark places where you think the Melians give a good reason for refusing to surrender.

**Interpretive Questions for Discussion**

1. Are the Melians fools or heroes for refusing the Athenian offer?
2. Do the Melians have a keener sense of honor than the Athenians, or are they merely using honor as a ploy for getting out of a tight spot?
3. Do the Athenians have a bad conscience about attacking the Melians?
4. Are the Melians or the Athenians more responsible for the fate of the Melians?

5. Why do the Athenians think that they will fare better if their subjects fear them than if their subjects trust them?

6. Why do the Athenians give the Melians a chance to avoid a battle? Why do they try to convince the Melians that might makes right, rather than just threaten them with their power?

7. Why do the Athenians assume that a show of generosity and friendship toward the Melians would be a sign of weakness rather than of confidence?

8. Do the Athenians believe that they are treating the Melians, their “inferiors,” fairly? (12)

9. Why do the Athenians not merely subdue the Melians, but wipe them out altogether?

10. Why do the Melians think it would be “criminal cowardice” to submit to the great strength of the Athenians? (9)

11. Why do the Melians put so much trust in the Lacedaemonian “sense of honor”? (10)

12. Why are we told that it is treachery from within, rather than Athenian power, that eventually subdues the Melians? (13)

13. Why does Thucydides tell us that the Lacedaemonians turned back from assisting Melos because they “found the sacrifices for crossing unfavorable”? (13)

14. Why do the Athenians make it clear from the beginning that they do not want to speak of justice?

15. Are we meant to think the Athenians are barbaric, or just trying to survive in a hard, dog-eat-dog world?

Passages for Textual Analysis

Page 8: beginning, “ATHENIANS: Then we will not make a long and unconvincing speech” and ending, “involve you in a crushing punishment that would be a lesson to the world.”

Pages 10–11: beginning, “ATHENIANS: Hope encourages men to take risks,” and ending, “and danger is a risk which the Lacedaemonians are little inclined to run.”
Postdiscussion Writing

1. Should the Melians have surrendered to the Athenians?
2. Were the Athenians justified in destroying the Melians, after giving them the option of surrender?
3. Is belief in pacifism and nonviolence an impractical attitude in a dangerous world?
4. Is it better to be idealistic or pragmatic?
5. Are the Melian rulers poor leaders? If you were one of the Melian people, what would you say to your leaders on finding out that they had refused the Athenian offer?
6. Does the “natural law” that the strong always rule over the weak apply to a democracy? (10)
7. What might countries facing Nazi Germany in World War II have learned from “The Melian Dialogue”?

*Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War describes the conflict between Athens and Sparta that took place between 431 and 404 B.C. and involved most of the Greek city-states on one side or the other. Melos, a small island off the southeastern coast of Greece, tried to remain independent and neutral, resisting an Athenian attempt to make it a tributary. Athens then sent a second expedition to subjugate the island, or at least to force it into an alliance. Before giving the order to attack, the Athenian generals sent representatives to negotiate with the Melians. The meeting dealt with the issue of whether a great power should be swayed by anything except self-interest in dealing with a smaller power.*
The Melian Dialogue
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The next summer the Athenians made an expedition against the isle of Melos. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders and at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards, upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. The Athenian generals encamped in their territory with their army, and before doing any harm to their land sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before the people, but told them to state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the council. The Athenian envoys then said:

ATHENIANS: As we are not to speak to the people, for fear that if we made a single speech without interruption we might deceive them with attractive arguments to which there was no chance of replying—we realize that this is the meaning of our being brought before your ruling body—we suggest that you who sit here should make security doubly sure. Let us have no long speeches from you either, but deal separately with each point, and take up at once any statement of which you disapprove, and criticize it.

MELIANS: We have no objection to your reasonable suggestion that we should put our respective points of view quietly to each other, but the military preparations which you have already made seem inconsistent with it. We see that you have come to be yourselves the judges of the debate, and that its natural conclu-

A selection from *The History of the Peloponnesian War.*
sion for us will be slavery if you convince us, and war if we get the better of the argument and therefore refuse to submit.

ATHENIANS: If you have met us in order to make surmises about the future, or for any other purpose than to look existing facts in the face and to discuss the safety of your city on this basis, we will break off the conversations; otherwise, we are ready to speak.

MELIANS: In our position it is natural and excusable to explore many ideas and arguments. But the problem that has brought us here is our security, so, if you think fit, let the discussion follow the line you propose.

ATHENIANS: Then we will not make a long and unconvincing speech, full of fine phrases, to prove that our victory over Persia justifies our empire, or that we are now attacking you because you have wronged us, and we ask you not to expect to convince us by saying that you have not injured us, or that, though a colony of Lacedaemon, you did not join her. Let each of us say what we really think and reach a practical agreement. You know and we know, as practical men, that the question of justice arises only between parties equal in strength, and that the strong do what they can, and the weak submit.

MELIANS: As you ignore justice and have made self-interest the basis of discussion, we must take the same ground, and we say that in our opinion it is in your interest to maintain a principle which is for the good of all—that anyone in danger should have just and equitable treatment and any advantage, even if not strictly his due, which he can secure by persuasion. This is your interest as much as ours, for your fall would involve you in a crushing punishment that would be a lesson to the world.

ATHENIANS: We have no apprehensions about the fate of our empire, if it did fall; those who rule other peoples, like the Lacedaemonians, are not formidable to a defeated enemy. Nor is it the Lacedaemonians with whom we are now contending: the danger is from subjects who of themselves may attack and conquer their rulers. But leave that danger to us to face. At the moment we shall prove that we have come in the interest of our empire and that in what we shall say we are seeking the safety of your state; for we wish you to become our subjects with least trouble to ourselves, and we would like you to survive in our interests as well as your own.
MELIANS: It may be your interest to be our masters; how can it be ours to be your slaves?

ATHENIANS: By submitting you would avoid a terrible fate, and we should gain by not destroying you.

MELIANS: Would you not agree to an arrangement under which we should keep out of the war, and be your friends instead of your enemies, but neutral?

ATHENIANS: No; your hostility injures us less than your friendship. That, to our subjects, is an illustration of our weakness, while your hatred exhibits our power.

MELIANS: Is this the construction which your subjects put on it? Do they not distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and peoples who are most of them your colonies, and some conquered rebels?

ATHENIANS: They think that one nation has as good rights as another, but that some survive because they are strong and we are afraid to attack them. So, apart from the addition to our empire, your subjection would give us security: the fact that you are islanders (and weaker than others) makes it the more important that you should not get the better of the mistress of the sea.

MELIANS: But do you see no safety in our neutrality? You debar us from the plea of justice and press us to submit to your interests, so we must expound our own, and try to convince you, if the two happen to coincide. Will you not make enemies of all neutral Powers when they see your conduct and reflect that some day you will attack them? Will not your action strengthen your existing opponents, and induce those who would otherwise never be your enemies to become so against their will?

ATHENIANS: No. The mainland states, secure in their freedom, will be slow to take defensive measures against us, and we do not consider them so formidable as independent island powers like yourselves, or subjects already smarting under our yoke. These are most likely to take a thoughtless step and bring themselves and us into obvious danger.

MELIANS: Surely then, if you are ready to risk so much to maintain your empire, and the enslaved peoples so much to escape from it, it would be criminal cowardice in us, who are still free, not to take any and every measure before submitting to slavery?

ATHENIANS: No, if you reflect calmly: for this is not a com-
petition in heroism between equals, where your honor is at stake, but a question of self-preservation, to save you from a struggle with a far stronger Power.

MELIANS: Still, we know that in war fortune is more impartial than the disproportion in numbers might lead one to expect. If we submit at once, our position is desperate; if we fight, there is still a hope that we shall stand secure.

ATHENIANS: Hope encourages men to take risks; men in a strong position may follow her without ruin, if not without loss. But when they stake all that they have to the last coin (for she is a spendthrift), she reveals her real self in the hour of failure, and when her nature is known she leaves them without means of self-protection. You are weak, your future hangs on a turn of the scales; avoid the mistake most men make, who might save themselves by human means, and then, when visible hopes desert them, in their extremity turn to the invisible—prophecies and oracles and all those things which delude men with hopes, to their destruction.

MELIANS: We too, you can be sure, realize the difficulty of struggling against your power and against Fortune if she is not impartial. Still we trust that Heaven will not allow us to be worsted by Fortune, for in this quarrel we are right and you are wrong. Besides, we expect the support of Lacedaemon to supply the deficiencies in our strength, for she is bound to help us as her kinsmen, if for no other reason, and from a sense of honor. So our confidence is not entirely unreasonable.

ATHENIANS: As for divine favor, we think that we can count on it as much as you, for neither our claims nor our actions are inconsistent with what men believe about Heaven or desire for themselves. We believe that Heaven, and we know that men, by a natural law, always rule where they are stronger. We did not make that law nor were we the first to act on it; we found it existing, and it will exist forever, after we are gone; and we know that you and anyone else as strong as we are would do as we do. As to your expectations from Lacedaemon and your belief that she will help you from a sense of honor, we congratulate you on your innocence but we do not admire your folly. So far as they themselves and their national traditions are concerned, the Lacedaemonians are a highly virtuous people; as for their behavior to others, much might be said, but we can put it shortly by
saying that, most obviously of all people we know, they identify their interests with justice and the pleasantest course with honor. Such principles do not favor your present irrational hopes of deliverance.

MELIANS: That is the chief reason why we have confidence in them now; in their own interest they will not wish to betray their own colonists and so help their enemies and destroy the confidence that their friends in Greece feel in them.

ATHENIANS: Apparently you do not realize that safety and self-interest go together, while the path of justice and honor is dangerous; and danger is a risk which the Lacedaemonians are little inclined to run.

MELIANS: Our view is that they would be more likely to run a risk in our case, and would regard it as less hazardous, because our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act and our kinship gives them more confidence in us than in others.

ATHENIANS: Yes, but an intending ally looks not to the good-will of those who invoke his aid but to marked superiority of real power, and of none is this truer than of the Lacedaemonians. They mistrust their own resources and attack their neighbors only when they have numerous allies, so it is not likely that, while we are masters of the sea, they would cross it to an island.

MELIANS: They might send others. The sea of Crete is large, and this will make it more difficult for its masters to capture hostile ships than for these to elude them safely. If they failed by sea, they would attack your country and those of your allies whom Brasidas* did not reach; and then you will have to fight not against a country in which you have no concern, but for your own country and your allies’ lands.

ATHENIANS: Here experience may teach you like others, and you will learn that Athens has never abandoned a siege from fear of another foe. You said that you proposed to discuss the safety of your city, but we observe that in all your speeches you have never said a word on which any reasonable expectation of it could be founded. Your strength lies in deferred hopes; in comparison with the forces now arrayed against you, your resources are too small for any hope of success. You will show a great want

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* Brasidas. A courageous and aggressive Spartan general who won many victories against the Athenians and their allies before he was killed in the tenth year of the war.
of judgment if you do not come to a more reasonable decision after we have withdrawn. Surely you will not fall back on the idea of honor, which has been the ruin of so many when danger and disgrace were staring them in the face. How often, when men have seen the fate to which they were tending, have they been enslaved by a phrase and drawn by the power of this seductive word to fall of their own free will into irreparable disaster, bringing on themselves by their folly a greater dishonor than fortune could inflict! If you are wise, you will avoid that fate. The greatest of cities makes you a fair offer, to keep your own land and become her tributary ally: there is no dishonor in that. The choice between war and safety is given you; do not obstinately take the worse alternative. The most successful people are those who stand up to their equals, behave properly to their superiors, and treat their inferiors fairly. Think it over when we withdraw, and reflect once and again that you have only one country, and that its prosperity or ruin depends on one decision.

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered, “Our resolution, Athenians, is unaltered. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has existed for seven hundred years; we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.”

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians broke up the conference saying, “To judge from your decision, you are unique in regarding the future as more certain than the present and in allowing your wishes to convert the unseen into reality; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived.”

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and as the Melians showed no signs of yielding, the generals at once began hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the
Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place.

Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, proclaimed that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians in a night attack took the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market, killed some of its garrison, and brought in corn and as many useful stores as they could. Then, retiring, they remained inactive, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future.

Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade the Argive territory, but on arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing unfavorable, and went back again. This intention of theirs made the Argives suspicious of certain of their fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. In consequence reinforcements were sent from Athens, and the siege was now pressed vigorously; there was some treachery in the town, and the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves; subsequently they sent out five hundred settlers and colonized the island.
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Fiction selections are presented in their entirety; most nonfiction selections are taken from longer works.